Random Drug Testing of Government
Employees: A Constitutional Procedure
Edward S. Adamst

Even the war on crime must be fought by constitutionalmethods for the Constitution protects the guilty as well as the innocent and proscribes condemned means
even when they are used for laudable ends.'

On July 30, 1986, President Reagan first hinted that a major
policy initiative was underway to curb drug use within the ranks of
federal government.2 Two and one half months later, the President
signed an executive order to initiate drug testing for a broad range
of the federal government's 2.8 million civilian employees. The
President earmarked approximately $56 million for the first year
of the program.'
Government employee drug testing prompts numerous legal
considerations. The paramount question, however, is whether random government drug testing of its employees is permissible under
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. The answer to that question is yes: random drug testing of government
employees is entirely consistent with fourth amendment guarantees if the government observes certain constitutional safeguards.
Part I of this comment considers the societal effects of drug
use, the purposes of drug testing, and the effectiveness of such
tests. Part II proposes a random drug testing procedure that passes
t B.A. 1985, Knox College; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987). The
Raab court upheld a random urinalysis program incorporating procedural safeguards.
2 Irving R. Kaufman, The Battle Over Drug Testing, The New York Times Magazine 52
(Oct. 19, 1986). President Reagan announced he was considering both widespread testing of
government employees and extension of then existing procedures of agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Postal Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
military services. Id.
- 3 C.F.R. § EO 12,564 (1987). See also Kaufman, N.Y.T.Mag. at 52 (cited in note 2).
This program is not the first indication of the federal government's concern over drug use.
Courts have permitted drug tests in the military. See, e.g., Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 469 n.10 (D.C.Cir. 1975). Similarly, administrative agencies have en-'
acted regulations regarding drug testing. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.12 (1973)(Federal Aviation
Commission ban on controlled substances on planes); 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (1985)(Department
of Transportation regulations on interstate truck drivers); 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1986)(Federal
Railroad Administration regulations).

1335

1336

The University of Chicago Law Revie[

3
[54:1335

fourth amendment scrutiny,4 as later parts of this comment
demonstrate. With this comment's model testing procedure as a
focal point, Part III examines the fourth amendment issues implicated by random drug testing of government employees, and demonstrates that the fourth amendment does not bar all random testing. Finally, Part IV moves beyond the fourth amendment and
illustrates that the procedure for employee evaluation and termination implemented by the Drug Testing Proposal of Part II complies with due process requirements.
I.

THE COSTS OF DRUG USE,

THE PURPOSE OF DRUG TESTING,
AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRUG TESTS

The effects of drug use on American society are great. The $27
billion to $110 billion in estimated narcotics traffic each year fuels
and contributes to crime.' Industrial costs of drug abuse are monu-

' Although this comment deals principally with fourth amendment problems, other
types of substantive constitutional attacks have been made on government drug testing programs involving urinalysis. For example, at first glance, a requirement that government employees submit to urinalyses that may later be used against them appears analogous to testimonial compulsion barred by the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Courts,
however, have repeatedly held that the fifth amendment does not apply to situations or acts
apart from an individual's communications or testimony. Compulsions that make the accused the source of real or physical evidence do not violate the fifth amendment. In Schmerher v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that blood tests were
physical evidence and thus not subject to fifth amendment immunity. Other forms of evidence in this category include fingerprints, photographs, writings or speech for identifica-

tion, appearances in court, standing, walking, or particular gestures used for identification.
Id. Courts have uniformly held that urine samples fall into this category. See, e.g., Raab, 816
F.2d at 181.
A stronger argument contends that drug testing through urinalysis infringes upon a
federal government employee's constitutional right to privacy. Resolution of this issue is
difficult and beyond the scope of this comment. Some of the privacy cases argue, however,
that mandatory drug testing through urinalysis does not violate the employee's right to privacy. These cases hold that the Constitution recognizes an individual's right to privacy only
in areas "relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and
childbearing." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). A court reading the privacy cases
broadly, however, might argue that the Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in regulation that threatens to expose activities done in the privacy of an individual's
home. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Alternatively, a court might
argue that the constitutional right to privacy prohibits the government from making widespread use of urinalysis test results. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (Brennan
concurring) ("[broad] dissemination by state officials of such information [as drug prescriptions] . . . would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests").
5 Evan Thomas, America's Crusade, Time 60, 63 (Sept. 1, 1986). In a study released in
1986, concentrating on suspects in New York and Washington, 56 percent of the suspects
tested were under the influence of drugs at the time of their arrest. Id.
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mental. "In human terms they include lost jobs, injuries, illnesses,
and deaths. In economic terms they include property damage, tardiness, absenteeism, lost productivity, quality control problems, increased health insurance costs, increased worker's compensation
costs, the cost of replacing and training new employees, and employee theft."6 Government estimates suggest that drug abuse cost
employers in the United States $33 billion in 1985. 7
Proponents envision drug testing as a partial solution to the
use of illegal drugs and the consequences of such use on American
society. Evidence indicates that for many businesses drug testing
has reduced the number of employee accidents while increasing
worker productivity." Already, numerous private employers utilize
random urinalysis in order to detect drug abuse. For example,
IBM, DuPont, Exxon, Lockheed, Shearson Lehman Brothers, Federal Express, United Airlines, Trans World Airlines, AT&T, and
the New York Times have instituted random drug testing programs for job applicants. Other businesses have begun to test not
just applicants, but also existing employees, for drug use. Two
Wall Street firms, Kidder, Peabody & Company and Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Company, recently became the first brokerage houses to check employees for the use of illegal drugs.' Finally,
about 25 percent of the Fortune 500 companies currently perform
drug screening, a sharp rise from three years ago, when only 10
percent of these employers maintained testing programs. 10
Opponents of drug testing argue that drug testing is inaccurate; some claim that drug tests yield inaccurate results up to 67
6 Thomas E. Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Work Place: Balancing Employer
and Employee Rights, 11 Emp.Rel.L.J. 181, 184 (1986).
Thomas, Time at 63 (cited in note 5). Some estimates suggest that the cost to industry
of drug abuse ranges from $50 billion to $100 billion annually due to increased health care
cost and lost productivity. David J. Hanson, Drug Abuse Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in the Workplace, Chem. & Eng. News ("C&EN") 7, 8 (June 2, 1986).
' After the Georgia Power Company implemented a drug testing program, the number
of accidents decreased from 5.4 injuries per 200,000 man hours to less than 0.5 per 200,000
man hours. Robert Angarola, Mandatory Drug Testing in the Workplace: Protect Safety,
Not Drug Abuse, A.B.A.J. 35 (Aug. 1986). Southern Pacific Railroad had similar results with
its program, reporting a 71 percent drop in on-the-job accidents and injuries due to humanrelated error as compared to the previous year. Id.
9 Kaufman, N.Y.T.Mag. at 53 (cited in note 2).
'oMark A. Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11
Emp.Rel.J. 422, 423 (1986). A recent survey indicates an additional 20 percent of Fortune
500 employers plan to institute such programs in two years. See Noel Dunivant & Associates, Drug Testing in Major U.S. Corporations: A Survey of the Fortune 500 (1985) (available from Noel Dunivant & Associates, Raleigh, N.C.).
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percent of the time. 1 Alternatively, opponents argue that even if
tests are highly accurate, the tests nonetheless will harm innocent
parties because they will produce false positives in some instances.12 Such criticism, however, is speculative at best. "Some
claim [c]hemical testing. . .can be as close to 100% reliable as science permits."'" The manufacturer of the most popular screening
test, EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique), claims
an accuracy rate of better than 95 percent,14 while GC (gas chromatography) tests are even more accurate.' 5 Additionally, a study
conducted by the United States Navy indicated that in 18,000 tests
administered during the period from 1982-1985, not a single false
positive was reported. 6 Moreover, even if the drug tests are
slightly inaccurate that does not mean that society should regard
" Hanson,

C&EN at 10 (cited in note 7). See also Hugh J. Hansen, Samuel P. Caudill &

D. Joe Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, 253 J.A.M.A. 2382 (1985)(tests 60 percent inaccurate);
Centers for Disease Control, Urine Testing for Detection of Marijuana Use: An Advisory, 32
Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 469 (1983) (tests 4 percent inaccurate).
Five basic types of drug testing exist: the enzyme multiplied immunoassay test (EMIT),
the radioimmunoassays test (RIA), the gas chromatography test (GC), the mass spectrometer test (MS) and the thin layer chromatography test (TLC). See Lee I. Dogoloff & Robert
T. Angarola, Urine Testing in the Workplace 18-20 (The American Council for Drug Education ed. 1985) ("Dogoloff, Urine Testing"). See also Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical
Urinalysis for the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 Wake Forest L.Rev. 391 (1984);
Philip J. Bigger, Urinalysis: Issues and Applications, 43 Fed. Probation 23 (1979)(examining
merits of certain drug testing methods). Employers commonly use EMIT and RIA tests as
initial screening tests. Dogoloff, Urine Testing at 20. While the employer may conduct
EMIT tests in the laboratory or workplace, John P. Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine
Screening for Misused Drugs, 16 J. Psychoactive Drugs 305, 306 (1984), GC and RIA tests
are restricted to a laboratory setting. Dogoloff, Urine Testing at 21. Employers commonly
use GC or MS tests to confirm positive EMIT or RIA results. Richard H. Schwartz & Richard L. Hawks, Laboratory Detection for Marijuana Use, 254 J.A.M.A. 788, 790 (Aug. 1985).
Moreover, while it costs an employer only $5 to conduct EMIT or RIA tests, Robert Lewy,
Preemployment Qualitative Urine Toxicology Screening, 25 J. Occup. Med. 579, 580 (1983),
the costs of GC or MS tests are $25-35. Dunivant, Drug Testing at 4 (cited in note 10).
2 Consider if an employer uses a drug test where one in every 20 tests results in a false
positive to screen a large number of employees. Assuming less than one percent of these
employees has actually used drugs, this "accurate" test will falsely accuse five employees for
every true accusation.
" Hanson, C&EN at 8 (cited in note 7) (quoting Robert E. Willette, former Head of the
Research Technology Branch at the National Institute of Drug Abuse and currently a director at Duo Research, a consulting company specializing in lab inspection and the monitoring
of lab performance).
14 Kaufman, N.Y.T.Mag. at 59 (cited in note 2). Courts have accepted EMIT test results
as 95 percent accurate. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 647 F.Supp. 875,
1986).
877 (E.D.Tenn.
"BThomas P. Moyer, Michael H. Palmen, et al., Marijuana Testing-How Good is It?
62 Mayo Clinic Proc. 413, 417 (1987) (reporting that the EMIT procedure using GC/MS
provides "virtually 100% accuracy in the detection of marijuana abuse").
1 Hanson, C&EN, at 8 (cited in note 7).
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drug testing as fundamentally unfair - even courts of law do not
1
require methods of perfect accuracy in reaching their decisions. 7
In addition to questions regarding accuracy, other problems
with drug testing do exist. First, no test can establish whether a
subject is under the influence of a drug at the time the test is administered. Second, the tests are incapable of determining if and
how much drug use impairs a given individual's level of performance. 19 Finally, critics disagree about whether mere passive inhalation of marijuana smoke would test positive. °
Despite the scientific disputes surrounding drug testing, and
the legal problems raised by such disagreements,2 1 this comment
will assume that urinalysis accurately detects whether an individual has used drugs in the past. This assumption serves three purposes. First, it prevents this comment from becoming a survey of
drug testing technology. Second, it acknowledges the strong
probability that technological advances will ultimately correct the
shortcomings of existing tests. Finally, it allows this comment to

'7 Even the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard requires some form of probability
calculus. Michael Saks & Robert Kidel, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 Law & Soc.Rev. 123 (1980). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Probability
Calculus, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1329 (1971) (the use of mathematical devices to rationalize adjudication may distort values which society pursues when conducting legal trials).
"IDogoloff, Urine Testing at 22 (cited in note 11); Urinalysis, for example, detects not
the intoxicating element of marijuana, THC, but its byproduct, the THC metabolite, which
remains in the body for extended periods of time. Comment, 20 Wake Forest L.Rev. at 397
(cited in note 11). Traces of other drugs, like marijuana, also remain in the body for extended lengths of time. For a survey of the times these drugs stay in the body see Chicago
Tribune, Tomorrow Section 6, at 1 (May 25, 1986).
" National Institute on Drug Abuse, Q. & A., Detection of Drug Use by Urinalysis 13
(1986); Arthur J. McBay, Cannabinoid Testing: Forensic and Analytical Aspects, 23
Lab.Mgmt. 36, 63 (1985). Some studies have attempted to measure an individual's performance while under the influence of drugs. For these results, see Jerome A. Yesavage, Von Otto
Leirer, et al., Effects of Marijuana Intoxication on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminary Report, 142 Am.J.Psych. 1325 (1985); G. Barnett, V. Licko & T. Thompson, Behavioral
Pharmacokinetics of Marijuana, 85 Psychopharmacology 51 (1985).
20 Dogoloff, Urine Testing at 23 (cited in note 11).
21 It is debatable whether, and under what circumstances, a court may admit test results into evidence in criminal prosecutions. See Comment, 20 Wake Forest L.Rev. at 408
(cited in note 11) (arguing that courts should only admit MS results as evidence of drug
use). Moreover, if authorities use test results as a basis for disciplinary proceedings, courts
have prescribed elaborate safeguards to ensure that the authorities do not violate subjects'
due process rights. Banks v. F.A.A., 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Wykoff v. Resig,
613 F.Supp. 1504 (N.D.Ind. 1985)(creating elaborate safeguards to ensure that authorities
preserve a subject's due process rights); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.Supp. 1500, 1506 (D.D.C.
1986) (dismissing bus driver on basis of single unconfirmed EMIT test is arbitrary and capricious). Courts also have had to grapple with existing scientific uncertainties as a factor in
determining the "reasonableness" of the search under the fourth amendment. See, e.g.,
Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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focus on a constitutional testing proposal rather than the potential
legal problems raised by the accuracy of drug tests.
II. A DRUG TESTING PROPOSAL
Drug testing presents a conflict between individual' and government interests. The following model random testing program
("Drug Testing Proposal") strikes the necessary balance between
these interests. As demonstrated in later parts of this comment,
this proposal addresses fourth amendment and due process concerns while implementing a random testing program that furthers
government interests.22
Drug Testing Proposal
(1) "Federalemployees" are employees to whom the federal
government pays a wage or salary. "Federalemployment
applicants" are those persons applying for positions as
federal employees.
(2) A federal agency, the Federal Drug Testing Agency
"(FDTA)", shall promulgate procedures to test federal
employees and federal employment applicants. The
agency shall select for testing categories of employees and
applicants based on evaluation of the government's interest in preventing drug use by such persons. At a minimum, a permissible procedure will:
(a) randomly test all federal employment applicants and
all federal employees applying to or employed in a
selected agency, sector, unit, or department of the
government. The FDTA shall test all such employees
and applicants similarly situated;
(b) (i) in the case of federal employees, the procedure
will be preceded by advance warning to the employee that the test will occur within six months.
Such warning will not release the exact date of
testing.
(ii) in the case of federal employment applicants:
such persons will have seven days advance notice
before a test is administered, accruing from the
time the applicant applies for government
22 For an account of pending and suggested state legislation on random testing, see
Note, Employee Drug Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs,
39 Stan.L.Rev. 1453 (1987).
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employment.
(3) Employees of the FDTA will directly conduct and supervise urinalysis testing. While conducting such tests,
FDTA employees:
(a) shall have no discretionregardingwhom they will test.
(b) shall not engage in direct observation of the federal
employee or federal employment applicant while such
person provides a urine sample. Other procedures to
prevent substitution of samples may be employed in
23
accordance with the "no direct observation" rule.
(4) A federal employee or federal employment applicant testing positive for drug use, as determined by an Enzyme
Immunoassay (EMIT) test, shall have the right to take a
Gas Chromatography (GC) test within two days of a positive EMIT test result. A federal employee or federal employment applicant who contests the EMIT finding and
decides to undergo a GC test must pay for the GC test if
the GC test results confirm the positive finding of the
EMIT test. If the test results of the GC test indicate that
the EMIT test findings were in error, the government
shall pay the cost for the GC test. The GC test findings
24
are binding on all parties.
(5) Consequences of Testing Positive
(a) Federal employment applicants testing positive for
drug use shall be prohibited from becoming a federal
employee until they pass a urinalysis test.
(b) Federal employees testing positive for drug use are
allowed two opportunities for rehabilitation after
positive drug tests. If the employee fails to make use
of these opportunities, the government may termi23 Concerns that the lack of surveillance may result in the substitution of samples can
be met by using various procedures, including: (1) checking the temperature of the sample
to assure it is not a substitute, (2) attaining a second sample shortly after the first because it
is unlikely a party will carry two or more substitute samples, and (3) conducting tests without a precise warning of the day the test will be conducted.
2' This provision addresses the accuracy concerns raised in part I of this comment. Because an EMIT test is only 95 percent accurate, critics of urinalysis point to the need for a
test which will reduce this 5 percent probability of error. The GC test is virtually one hundred percent accurate. By shifting the cost burden to the employee or applicant, this provision also assures that drug users who test positive under the EMIT test will be deterred
from taking their chances on the second test incorrectly exculpating them. The brevity of
the two-day period between the EMIT results and the GC test lessens the likelihood that
the GC test will show a negative result solely due to the dissipation of drugs in the body
over time.
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nate the employee pursuant to the procedures outlined below. The government shall bear the expense
for the first rehabilitationprogram. The employee
shall bear the cost of the second rehabilitationprogram. After two such rehabilitation programs, the
government may terminate the employee if he or she
again tests positive for drug use. Before such termination, the government must provide the employee
with oral or written notice of the charges against him
or her .and give the employee: (1) an opportunity to
show any error that may exist; (2) the names and nature of the testimony of witnesses against the employee; (3) a meaningful opportunity to be heard in
his own defense; and (4) a hearing before an impartial administratorprior to termination.
(6) Urine samples obtained from federal employees or federal employment applicants shall be used for the sole
purpose of drug testing. The results of such tests will remain confidential. Only the federal government will use
the drug test results and the government will use the results solely to make federal employment decisions. Drug
test results will not be used for criminal prosecution or
released to any other government agency. The government shall destroy a government employee's drug test results within three years after the employee provided the
urine sample.
III.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS IMPLICATED BY GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE URINALYSIS

The purpose of the fourth amendment2 5 is straightforward: to
prevent the government26 from engaging in unreasonable searches
21

The fourth amendment reads in pertinent part:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons.. against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
26 See, e.g., Curdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (fourth amendment's "origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon activities of sovereign
authority"). In the urinalysis context, private employers can screen employees for drug use
without implicating the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Monroe v. Consolidated Freightways,
654 F.Supp. 661, 663 (E.D.Mo. 1987). For sources concerning a private employer's right to
test its employees for drugs see Katherine Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work,
Cal.Lawyer 28 (April 1986); Geidt, 11 Emp.Rel.L.J. 181 (cited in note 6); Rothstein, 11
Emp.Rel.L.J. 422 (cited in note 10).
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and seizures of individuals. However, an individual's right to be
free from government intrusions is not absolute. The context in
which fourth amendment rights arise shapes the content and incidents of such rights;28 acts permissible in one context violate the
fourth amendment in another.
The "fluctuant" nature of an individual's fourth amendment
rights is of crucial importance. This aspect of fourth amendment
doctrine suggests that all drug testing of government employees or
employment applicants is not a per se violation of the fourth
amendment. The amendment does not foreclose the possibility
that a limited governmental intrusion may be permissible in a
given context.
A. Urinalysis: Neither a Seizure nor a Search
The threshold question in fourth amendment analysis is
whether 2the government activity of concern is a "seizure" or
"search." This subsection deals primarily with the argument that
urinalysis of government employees constitutes a search, largely
because the argument that urinalysis constitutes a seizure is not
widely accepted. In the context of government employee urinalysis,
a seizure may occur "at two levels-the seizure of the person necessary to bring him into contact with the government

. .

and the

Commentators have suggested extending fourth amendment doctrine to include large
private corporations. See, e.g., Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private
Groups, and the Law, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 155 (1957). As Professor Friedmann has noted, "Corporate organizations of business and labor have long ceased to be a private phenomenon."
Id. at 176. "They have a direct and decisive impact on the social, economic, and political life
of the nation." Id. The Court so far has been reluctant to adopt the position of such commentators, noting that "[c]areful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an
area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal judicial power." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
27 The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment specifically protects individuals and not places from unreasonable searches. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
28 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. See also United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir.
1984); Callaway, 518 F.2d at 476.
2 This threshold inquiry is extremely important. As Professor Amsterdam has noted:
The question of what constitutes a covered "search" or "seizure". . . should be viewed
with an appreciation that to exclude any particular police activity from coverage is
essentially to exclude it from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness,
whereas to include it is to do no more than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 393
(1974). See also Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th
Cir. 1982).

1344

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:1335

subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence." 30 Case law supports the contention that no "seizure" of a person occurs when a
public employer directs an employee to report to a facility during
working hours for the collection of a urine sample. 1 The government does not impede an employee's freedom of movement when
it directs the employee to report to a urine collection site any more
than the government impedes freedom of movement by directing
the employee to go to his usual work site. An employee already has
accepted a restriction on his freedom of movement imposed by his
obligation to his employer.2 Arguably, these same considerations
apply to employment applicants. When applying for government
employment, an applicant impliedly accepts an employer's right to
restrain the applicant's movement temporarily. If he reports to the
facility for testing, the applicant consents to contact with the
government.
Similarly, the act of collecting urine is, in most circumstances,
not a "seizure." Urine is a body waste, typically abandoned without concern. It is not the property of an individual to which one
attaches a possessory interest.33 This argument is not meant to
suggest that the taking of a urine sample is per se not a seizure.
Such a per se line would be inappropriate: even the abandonment
of urine might constitute a seizure in some circumstances. As the
Ninth Circuit has said, "the proper test for abandonment is not
whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but
whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.

30

'3

Nonetheless, as

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).

31 See Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1971) (compulsory lineup of

police department employees permissible because it "was to be conducted at a time and
place that were well within the usual demands of a policeman's job"). See also Turner v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. App. 1985)(Nebeker concurring)(employment context in which a urine sample is given "eliminates any issue of seizure
of the officer's [government employee's] person").
11 See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984)("ordinarily when people are at work
their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted . . . by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers").
33 Some courts have suggested as much: see, e.g., Venner v. State, 367 A.2d 949, 956
(Ct.App.Md. 1977) (no property right in excretion because it is the human experience to
abandon it immediately); Turner, 500 A.2d at 1011 (Nebeker concurring)(one "logically"
cannot retain any possessory right in one's urine); Raab, 816 F.2d at 176 (same). But see
Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F.Supp. 245, 249 (N.D.Ga. 1986)(holding government taking of a
urine specimen as a "seizure" while erroneously citing cases which have held it is a
"search").
"' United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th.Cir. 1972)(citations omitted). See also
Alinovi v, Worcester School Committee, 777 F.2d 776, 781 (1st Cir. 1985).
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the discussion of "searches" below will show, the reasonable expectation of privacy concern is minimal in the context of this comment's Drug Testing Proposal. One properly can conclude that
urine samples taken pursuant to this proposal are not seizures
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The main focus of court decisions dealing with urinalysis has
been on whether such a procedure constitutes a search of the employee's person, not on whether urinalysis constitutes a seizure.
Urinalysis is a "search" implicating the fourth amendment only if
it infringes upon an individual's expectation of privacy. Traditionally, the courts have applied a two-part test when deciding upon a
claim that the government has infringed an individual's expectation of privacy. First, the individual must exhibit a "subjective expectation of privacy." Second, the expectation must be "one that
society considers reasonable. 8'

5

A search of objects that a person

knowingly exposes to the public,36 or a search of objects pursuant
to an individual's consent,3 7 does not implicate the fourth amendment. Although courts are virtually unanimous in holding that
urine tests invade an employee's expectation of privacy and are
therefore fourth amendment searches,38 courts have taken various
approaches when addressing this question. Some liken required
urinalysis to the taking of an involuntary blood sample. 9 Others
35 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan concurring). The
Supreme
Court has ruled that the subjective test is irrelevant in certain circumstances, and that the
objective test is controlling in those circumstances. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 525 n.7 (1984).
36Utilizing the "knowingly exposes to the public" standard, courts have reasoned that
the taking of voice and handwriting samples are not fourth amendment "searches".
Dionosio, 410 U.S. at 14 (1973)(voice); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973)
(handwriting).
37 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
38See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th
Cir. 1976); Shoemaker v. Handel ("Shoemaker II"), 619 F.Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J. 1985);
Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F.Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (W.D.Wis 1985); Storms, 600 F.Supp. at 121820; Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex.App. 1983); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F.Supp 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S. 2d 789, 797 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986); Turner, 500 A.2d at 1005; Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 879; Raab, 816 F.2d at 175; Smith
v. City of East Point, No. 73757, slip op. at 5 (Ct.App.Ga. June 24, 1987); Mullholland v.
Dept. of Army, 660 F.Supp. 1565, 1568 (E.D.Va. 1987); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local
1277 v. Sunline Transit Authority, 663 F.Supp. 1560, 1566 (C.D.Cal. 1987); Smith v. White,
No. Civ-1-87-187, slip op. at 5 (E.D.Tenn. Aug. 11, 1987); Rushton v. Nebraska Public
Power District, 653 F.Supp. 1510, 1523 (D.Neb. 1987).
One court has hinted that urinalysis may not be a search. See, e.g., National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057, 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham
concurring) (questioning whether requiring urine specimens from applicants for sensitive
positions in United States Customs Service "is a search or seizure at all").
39 See, e.g., McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir, 1987); Allen v. City of
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rely on a "personal secrets rationale."'4 0 And still others have
blindly adhered to what they consider binding precedent. 41 The argument shared by all of these courts is that "[o]ne does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it
available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the
physiological secrets it holds. '42 A further examination of the privacy concern will demonstrate, however, that the fourth amendment does not protect an individual's subjective expectation of privacy in certain contexts. Application of this comment's drug
testing proposal is one such example.
1. Subjective Expectation of Privacy. The first prong of the
Katz test directs attention to an individual's subjective expectation of privacy. Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that
the subjective expectation of privacy is in some circumstances "an
inadequate index" of fourth amendment protection,4" the subjective component of the Katz test retains a very general utility. Even
where the courts rely on the existence of an objective expectation
of privacy-that is, an expectation that society would consider reasonable-an individual's subjective expectation of privacy may be
relevant: if the subjective expectation is great, courts are more
likely to find that the government has violated the fourth
amendment.4 4
When evaluating an individual's subjective expectation of privacy in the urinalysis context, courts must consider two factors:
the testing methods used and the individual's status as a government employee.45 Many have recognized the privacy accorded to
urination; a number of courts, for example, have reasoned that
drug testing is too intrusive a search 46 because government surveil-

Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D.Ga. 1985); Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 879; Storms, 600
F.Supp. at 1218.
40 Raab, 816 F.2d at 170 (5th Cir. 1987); McDonnell, 809 F.2d at 1307; Capua, 643
F.Supp. at 1513; Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 249; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
"I See, e.g., National Federation of Gov't. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935
(D.C.Cir. 1987); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (N.Y.App.Div. 1986).
42 McDonnell, 612 F.Supp. at 1127.
" Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
44 Smith v. City of East Point, No. 73757 slip op. at 2.
"I Shoemaker v. Handel ("Shoemaker I"), 608 F.Supp. 1151, 1158 (D.N.J. 1985) (a court
must consider an individual's expectations of privacy "under the circumstances").
46 Courts, however, have considered this factor when deciding if urinalysis in the context of a given case constituted an unreasonable search rather than when deciding whether
urinalysis constituted a search at all. See, e.g., McDonnell, 612 F.Supp. at 1127; Capua, 643
F.Supp. at 1513; Storms, 600 F.Supp. at 288-89; Allen, 601 F.Supp. at 488.
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lance of urination is "very embarrassing and humiliating. ' 47 The
proposition that urinating while under observation is embarrassing
suggests that a procedure which bars such observation substantially lessens the privacy concern. Section 3(b) of the Drug Testing
Proposal therefore provides that the FDTA officials administering
the test shall not directly observe an employee during urination.
Under such conditions, providing a urine sample is akin to the normal performance of a routine bodily function and does not violate
48
an individual's actual expectation of privacy.
Some courts have ruled that an individual not only has an expectation of privacy in the process of urination but also in the information contained in the urine.49 These courts reason that examination of the urine sample will reveal other personal secrets that
the government has no right to know. Under this view, any examination of urine will be a search.
The Drug Testing Proposal addresses this argument. Section 6
of the proposal allows testing only for illicit drug use and such results are strictly confidential. The Supreme Court has recently
said, in the law enforcement context, that testing which reveals
whether an individual has used drugs "and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest." 50
In addition to testing procedures, status as a government employee or employment applicant affects an individual's subjective
expectation of privacy. In both the public and private sectors, an
employee or applicant has a lesser expectation of privacy about information relevant to the employee's job or the applicant's prospective job because an employer, consistent with the very nature
of employment, has the prerogative to conduct reasonable inquiries
into an employee's or applicant's fitness for duty. 1 In the federal
47 Capua,
48

643 F.Supp. at 1514.

For a discussion of unintrusive procedures to detect substitution of urine samples, see

note 23.
" See, e.g., Raab, 816 F.2d at 175-176.
1o United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
51 A powerful argument might be made that an employer's need to oversee an employee's fitness for duties does not extend to situations where an employee's off-duty behavior does not affect his job performance. This argument, however, ignores two concerns. First,
a federal employee is an outward symbol of the federal government. In a very real sense the
federal government has an interest in assuring that he presents a proper image of his organization. Of course, this argument is weak with regard to employees not easily recognized as
affiliated with the government. Second and more important, it is more costly-potentially
impossible-to monitor a slight decrease in an employee's efficiency (for example, 10 percent) by means of observing his performance. Because slight decreases in efficiency over the
government as a whole can represent a substantial loss, testing designed to prevent drug use
offers an optimal solution. See also cases cited in note 56.
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government, for example, employees and applicants routinely submit to physical examinations which often include urine testing and
full field background investigations.2 Courts in the urinalysis context, moreover, have recognized that there is "no constitutional
difficulty with. . . regularly conducted physicals or the requested
physicals, or a pre-employment physical, even if they involve
urinalysis for drugs. ' 53 The argument supporting physical examinations also supports the requirement of drug tests through urinalysis: employees and applicants accept employer perlustration as an
unstated condition of employment. As a result, their actual expectation of privacy is lower.
Courts have also recognized that a government employee's
subjective expectation of privacy is reduced precisely because the
employee works for the government rather than for a private employer. 54 For example, courts have repeatedly noted that-based
upon the nature of their employment-correction and law enforcement officers have a reduced expectation of privacy.5 5 In addition,
one court has reasoned that FBI agents' expectations of privacy
are diminished because their employer advised them in advance of
the FBI's strong interest in assuring the integrity of its agents.5 6
When applied to this comment's Drug Testing Proposal, these
cases suggests that the government employee's subjective expectation of privacy is lower than it might otherwise be if the employee
worked for a private employer.
The employment context argument is problematic, however.

52

The federal government requires employees in, or applicants for, positions with phys-

ical or medical standards to submit to physical examination prior to appointment or
selection, 5 C.F.R. 339.301(a)(1) (1987), on a regularly recurring periodic basis, id. at
339.301(a)(2), or whenever a question arises about an employee's capacity to meet the physical or medical qualifications of the position. Id. at 339.30(a)(3). For courts upholding routine
physicals as constitutional, see Brachter v. United States, 149 F.2d 742, 745 (4th Cir. 1945);
McDonnell, 612 F.Supp. at 1130 n.6; Curry v. New York Transit Authority, 56 N.Y.S.2d 798,
437 N.E.2d 1158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). The government also conducts extensive full-field
investigations into applicant's backgrounds for sensitive positions in the federal service. See
Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter 733.
53Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 881 n.7; Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v.
City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430, 434 n.6 (Sup.Ct.N.J. 1987). But see Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at
583 (implying physical exams and urinalysis are not similar).
Pervasive government regulation of private industry also reduces an individual's expectation of privacy. See Shoemaker v. Handel (Shoemaker III), 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d
Cir. 1986); Patchogue-Medford, 505 N.Y.S.2d at, 904.
55 McDonnell, 809 F.2d at 1306; Sec. & Law Enforcement Emp., Dist. Council 82 v.
Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 1984); Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir.
1971).
58 Mack v. United States, FBI, 653 F.Supp. 70, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), afi'd, Mack v.
United States, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Opponents of testing argue, for example, that a mere warning may
not substitute for fourth amendment protections. An extreme form
of the warning rationale would mean that the government could
search individuals at will if warnings were given which reduced an
individual's subjective expectation of privacy. While ignoring the
reasonable expectation of privacy prong of the test, the critics' argument does point to a difficulty with the subjective expectations
prong: its circularity. A government activity is only a "search" if it
implicates an individual's actual expectation of privacy which, in
turn, varies depending on the government activities that precede
or accompany the search. Commentators and courts alike have recognized that this test alone is insufficient to protect fourth amendment interests. 57 Thus, in determining whether government action
constitutes a search, courts have focused on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. The second prong of
the "search" analysis says that a "search" occurs only when government activity infringes on an individual's expectation of privacy
that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' , Standards
of "reasonableness" vary for different individuals and circumstances59 because the fourth amendment does not recognize privacy interests in the abstract, but only in the concrete circumstances of each case. e0 In the urinalysis context, courts have
recognized this principle and have therefore concentrated upon the
facts involved in the case before the court."1
In the employment context, courts take into account two factors when defining the scope of the privacy interests that society
17 See

Amsterdam, 58 Minn.L.Rev. at 384 (cited in note 29), commenting that:

an actual expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz

held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither add to, nor
can its presence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If
it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy
merely by announcing half-hourly on television that ... we are forthwith being placed
under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
"sKatz, 389 U.S. at 361.
" For example, courts do not regard a politician to have as great an expectation of
privacy as an individual citizen. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)(recognizing a lower degree of privacy for political figures in a first amendment context). See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1498 (1987)(public employee's reasonable
expectation of privacy "must be assessed in the context of the employment relationship").
60

See Ortega, 107 S.Ct. at 1498 ("question of whether an employee has reasonable ex-

pectation of privacy must be addressed on a case by case basis"); Callaway, 518 F.2d at 476
("What is reasonable in one context may not be reasonable in another").

"' See Callaway, 518 F.2d at 476; Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12, 524
A.2d at 435; Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at 588; Raab, 816 F.2d at 176.
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recognizes as "reasonable:" (1) the deference usually granted by
courts with regard to conditions of employment, and (2) the intrinsic nature of the occupation. Traditionally, courts have afforded
employers broad latitude in defining conditions or regulations of
employment.6 2 Courts also have recognized that this latitude may
reduce an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy." In particular, courts have allowed government employers great freedom
in conducting reasonable inquiries into an employee's fitness for
duties. 4 They recognize, moreover, that the fourth amendment
does not prevent the government from exercising its power as an
"employer to supervise and investigate the performance" of its employees. 6 Because courts widely recognize that the government can
impose conditions on employment, the legitimate expectation of
privacy accorded federal employees requested to undergo fitnessrelated urinalysis is limited. Urinalysis is a condition of employment similar to physical exams which, as mentioned earlier, have
not been classified as searches.
Critics raise the argument that urinalysis is distinct from
other conditions of employment because it seeks to impose restrictions on what an employee does in his off-duty time. This argument, however, is not convincing. Urinalysis tests reflect the employer's prerogative to discover worker impairments, not a desire
to monitor an employee's off-duty conduct. If an employee's activities affect his work performance, an employer has every reason to
deter such activities. Urinalysis, like a physical exam, detects
shortcomings in an employee that a supervisor cannot easily discover through observation of work performance.6 6 An employer
must be able to detect even slight defects in performance since
even small impairments can prove extraordinarily costly. Thus, as

62 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937) (National Labor

Relations Act respects employers' right to hire and discharge workers). See also Carey, 737
F.2d at 203; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (employer may place reasonable conditions on job
including scrutiny for drug use).
63 See United States v. Donato, 269 F.Supp. 921, 923 (E.D.Pa. 1973) (employee's privacy
interest in his locker held subject to employer's rules and regulations); United States v.
Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1975)(no reasonable expectation of privacy in view of
pervasive regulation of the workplace); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670 (5th
Cir. 1979).
04 See cases cited in note 52; see also Raab, 816 F.2d at 178.
6' United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1965). United States v. Nasser,
476 F.2d 1111, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973)(electronic surveillance of IRS employee to verify
whether he was properly performing IRS work in his IRS office not unreasonable).
66 See Mullholland, 660 F.Supp. at 1569 (direct observation provides little basis to assess an individual's possible use of drugs; tests are more conclusive). But see Feliciano, 661
F.Supp. at 586 (observation alone should indicate drug use).
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is the case with physical exams, courts should rule that urinalysis

tests are not searches.
Conditions on employment reduce an employee's expectation
of privacy in a second way as well: society is less likely to recognize
the expectation as objectively reasonable if the employer has
warned the employee through conditions on employment that a
test is likely to occur.67 In Shoemaker v. Handel,5 for example, a
third circuit court found that racing jockeys had no legitimate expectation of privacy vis-a-vis urinalysis because they knew such
tests were a possibility when they became involved with the horseracing industry. Moreover, where objective rather than subjective
expectations of privacy are at issue, there is no danger that recognition of the manner in which warnings diminish expectations of
privacy will undermine fourth amendment guarantees entirely.
Where purely subjective expectations are at issue, a warning may
undercut completely an individual's expectation of privacy. By
contrast, where objective expectations are at issue, a warning will
always be only one factor in determining if an individual's expectation is reasonable.6 9
Besides the deference traditionally granted to employers with
regard to employee regulations, an additional factor governs reasonable expectations of privacy in the present context: courts in
the urinalysis context have found that the nature of the employee's
occupation may affect the employee's reasonable expectation of
privacy. As one federal district court reasoned, regardless of occupation, individuals "have an expectation of privacy upon taking a
position with the government that is diminished in comparison
with that reasonably held by members of the public at large. "70
More specifically, courts have recognized that public employees
such as military personnel,7 1 policemen, 2 firefighters, corrections
17 See United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978) ("An established
regulatory scheme or specific office practice may ... diminish an employee's reasonable
expectation of privacy."); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). Of course,
the search warned of must be reasonable.
6-795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Shoemaker III").
"See §2(b) of the Drug Testing Proposal.
10 American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 733 (considering
constitutionality of urinalysis testing program). See also Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 880 ("employees, as opposed to the general citizenry, have a somewhat diminished expectation of
privacy"); Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12, 524 A.2d at 436; Feliciano, 661
F.Supp. at 588 (court "ascribes to the universally recognized proposition that by accepting
government employment, public employees' legitimate expectations of privacy are somewhat
less than that of their private sector counterparts").
" Callaway, 518 F.2d at 477.
12 Turner, 500 A.2d at 1008; Biehunik, 441 F.2d at 231.

1352

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:1335

officers,7 4' and bus drivers 5 have a different and reduced expectation of privacy as a result of their occupations.
If one interprets this case law restrictively, only those government employees entrusted with public safety have a significantly
reduced expectation of privacy. Under this line of reasoning, a postal clerk, for example, might not have a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy while police officers and bus drivers would. This
reasoning, however, underestimates the distinction between public
employees and private employees. Public employees do not pose a
greater threat to public safety than private employees. Many workers in the private sector, construction workers for example, can
harm the public if negligent. Rather, it is more reasonable for the
government to regulate public employees because such persons are
servants of the public and hence answerable to public officials. The
postal worker is no less of a public servant than the police officer.
In both cases, precisely because the employees are public servants,
the government has both a general interest in projecting a positive
public image and a specific interest in assuring efficient use of public resources. Coupling the broad latitude of employers to establish
conditions of employment with the employee's reduced expectation
of privacy as a government employee, a court should not recognize
a reasonable expectation of privacy where the government uses
urinalysis to determine an employee's fitness for duties. As long as
the government limits itself to testing only for illicit drug use, no
"search" occurs when a government employee undergoes a urine
test as a reasonable condition of employment. 6
3. Consent of Public Employees and Applicants. A theory of
consent also may justify drug testing of government employees
since consent negates an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.77 To alleviate fourth amendment concerns, however, such
consent must be voluntary and not coerced "by explicit, or implicit

13 See, e.g., City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 1324 (FI.App. 1985); Lovvorn,
647 F.Supp. at 880.
7'McDonell, 612 F.Supp. at 1128; Carey, 737 F.2d at 202.
71 Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267; Jones, 628 F.Supp. at 1508.
76

Only if the government seeks to investigate the personal concerns of its employ-

ees-actions distinct from employee performance-does a search occur. Such an investiga-

tion would not be a reasonable condition of employment. Examples of such searches include
venereal disease testing, psychological profile tests not relevant to a party's occupation, and
investigations into aspects of a party's ethnic background and political leanings which are
not relevant to the occupation in question. A search also might occur if the government
investigation goes beyond a basic full physical exam or psychological study. But a random
drug testing program, unlike these examples, is not a search.
7 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).

1987]

Random Drug Testing

1353

means, by implied threat or covert force. ' 78 Therefore, an important question in the context of urinalysis is whether government
employees or applicants voluntarily consent to such tests as a condition of employment.79
Consent can take two forms: express or implied. Express consent occurs when an individual consents to the test orally or in
writing. Implied consent occurs when an individual undergoes the
test without objection, or otherwise acts in a way which reasonably
indicates that he finds the test unobjectionable.8 0 When courts
have considered the issue of government employee consent in the
urinalysis context, both forms of consent have been present.,,
Nonetheless, courts have found that consent does not validate
a "search." Some courts have explained this conclusion by reasoning that "consent to future unreasonablesearches is not a reasonable condition of employment,"82 and thus not legitimate consent.
An analysis of the "reasonableness" of such searches appears later
in this comment. More important for present purposes, at least one
court has held that a government employee does not consent to
required urinalysis where the penalty for refusal is termination, arguing that consent in circumstances where the employee "legitimately fear[s] termination" is coercive.8 "
7'8
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. Voluntariness is a question of fact the court must determine "from all the circumstances." Id. at 248-49. Voluntary consent can exist even though a
party does not know he has the right to refuse to give his consent. Id. at 249. However, a
person's knowledge of this right to refuse may be taken into account when considering the
voluntariness of consent. Id.
7' The concepts of consent and waiver are distinct. If one consents to a government
investigation, it is not a search. If one waives constitutional rights, then a search occurs; one
merely does not contest such activity. In the urinalysis context, courts have held that the
government cannot condition employment on waiver of an employee's fourth amendment
rights. Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 793; American Federation of Government Employees, 651
F.Supp. at 736. See also Ortega, 107 S.Ct. at 1498-99 (search must be "reasonable condition
of employment").
80See, e.g., United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding consent where
large sign passed each day by prison employees warned that all persons entering prison were
subject to search); United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1976)(one can consent through words, gestures or conduct).
91For cases considering express signed consent forms, see McDonell, 612 F.Supp. at
1131; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 791; American Federation of Government Employees, 651
F.Supp. at 736. For cases considering implied consent, see Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142;
Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 249; Feliciano, 651 F.Supp. at 591.
11 McDonell, 612 F.Supp. at 1131 (original emphasis); Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 792-93;
American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 736. For the general proposition that government employers cannot require employees to consent to unreasonable
searches as a condition of employment, see Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968); Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
'3American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 736.
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Such an assertion, although intuitively attractive, is incorrect.
Termination of employment is the most extreme result of an employee's refusal to undergo urinalysis. 84 Likewise, denial of employment for an applicant is the most serious consequence of a refusal
to consent. However, these outcomes do not "coerce" employees to
consent even though the result of an employee's refusal to consent
is the termination of a voluntary employment relationship or the
loss of an employment opportunity. 5
In analogous contexts, for example, courts have found voluntary consent where individuals faced either a possible loss of economic livelihood or a loss of freedom of movement for failure to
consent to a "search." First, courts have upheld consent where an
individual decides whether to board a plane and submit to a
"search," or to forego boarding the plane and thus avoid the
"search. '8 6 Second, courts have found voluntary consent when attorneys choose to enter courthouses. As one court has noted in this
context: "[A]lthough an attorney's consent to a search is exacted as
the price of entering the courthouse to discharge duties necessary
to his profession, the search is nevertheless consensual in the same
way as in the airport cases. ' 87 Third, courts have held that anyone
entering a military installation voluntarily consents to government
"searches," even if the search is a mandatory requirement for entry.8 8 Fourth, the Supreme Court has found voluntary consent
where the government makes public aid contingent on visits to the
recipients' homes.8 9 Finally, in regard to urine testing, courts have
found voluntary consent where (1) an individual operates a motor
vehicle on a public road, 90 or (2) where an individual chooses to
S, Courts have not yet considered any program involving a more extreme result such as

criminal prosecution. See, e.g., American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp.
at 736; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
85 For a related case, see Zap, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), judgment vacated on unrelated
issues, 330 U.S. 800 (1947)(court found voluntary consent although the only way to attain
government business was to submit to a search).
81 See United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1973).
87 McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978).
8' United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Matthews,
431 F.Supp. 70, 73 (W.D.Okla. 1976).
8' Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971). Although the Supreme Court has not
overturned this decision, other courts have criticized its logic. See, e.g., Feliciano 661
F.Supp. at 593 (refusing to apply Wyman in urinalysis context and suggesting that the case
should be limited to its facts).
9o State v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 241, 242-43 (Nev. 1972) (implied voluntary consent to
a test for intoxication). See also State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 849 (R.I. 1980). Admittedly,
these cases involve some form of reasonable suspicion (for instance, where the police officer
stopped the party because he suspected intoxication) and are thus not wholly analogous to
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remain in a pervasively regulated industry with knowledge that the
proper authorities will test for drug use."'
Admittedly, there are differences between magnetometer
searches, courthouse searches, and urinalysis. In the magnetometer
and courthouse situations, the search is directed toward weapons
that might endanger public safety. In the case of urine testing for
government employees, the link between drug testing and public
safety often is nonexistent.
Some Supreme Court precedent suggests, however, that the
public safety distinction does not explain existing case law. Consent in the public aid situation did not depend upon this distinction since the government did not search the recipients' homes in
order to protect public safety. The Court nevertheless allowed the
government to condition the receipt of benefits upon the recipients' voluntary consent to a search. 2
Moreover, the similarities between the magnetometer and
courthouse searches and required urinalysis are more compelling
than the differences between these tests. First, the temporal aspect
of the government activities is an important element in consent
cases. In each situation, the government seeks to prevent certain
activity during a discrete time period-for example, while the
party is at work or in a plane. To prevent such activity, however,
the government must regulate a party's actions before he enters
the plane or begins work. In both cases, the government regulates a
party's behavior before a given event is allowed to take place. A
party cannot engage in a given activity unless his prior behavior is
acceptable.
Potential economic duress is a second important similarity between required urinalysis and the consent cases. All of these
searches involve choices that will affect an individual's economic
livelihood. In the airplane and courthouse cases, courts have found
valid consent to searches even though the price of nonconsent was
substantial.9 Airline travel, for example, is "all but a necessity"9
for many occupations today. Nevertheless, courts hold that an individual boarding an airplane voluntarily consents to a search.
Likewise, entering a courthouse is virtually a necessity for litirandom urine testing or airport searches.
9'Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142.
See Wyman, 400 F.2d 309.
g3 This is precisely the choice that jockeys faced in Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142,
where the court upheld random urine testing while alluding to employee consent as a factor
in its decision.
9,McMorris, 567 F.2d at 900-01.
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gators, but courts have found that such persons voluntarily consent
to courthouse searches, despite the harshness that refusal entails.
When compared with magnetometer and courthouse searches,
the Drug Testing Proposal places no greater economic burdens on
the employee for failure to consent than is put on the attorney or
traveller. An employee who chooses not to comply with required
urinalysis may have to find a new job. But the government employee's situation is no different from that of a litigator who refuses to consent to a courthouse search and must as a result change
her entire line of work.
Accordingly, the fear that urinalysis might rob individuals of
the opportunity to make a meaningful consent decision is misplaced. An employee's consent is voluntary in this context. As a
result, urinalysis is not a "search" within the fourth amendment.9 5
B.

Is Urinalysis Reasonable?

Even if courts regard urinalysis as a search, the "underlying
command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and
seizures be reasonable."9 6 "Reasonableness" in the fourth amendment context "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application." Rather, in each case a court must determine whether
a search is "reasonable" by balancing the invasion of personal
7
rights entailed by the search against the need for the search.
1. Intrusiveness of Urinalysis. "Reasonableness" does not turn
solely on whether the government could have used less intrusive
means to search. 8 Rather, in each situation, a court must determine the "reasonableness" of a search by assessing the intrusive95Voluntary consent may be complicated in cases where a non-probationary public employee has a property right in public employment. Nonetheless, most programs considered
do not involve termination as a result of the employee refusing to consent. But see 1st drug
offense to cost U.S. workers their jobs, Chicago Tribune, at 3, col. 3 (Dec. 18, 1986). Moreover, the Drug Testing Proposal calls instead for rehabilitation following the first two instances in which an individual tests positive. This procedure alleviates the fear that an individual may lose his job by consenting to testing. See Drug Testing Proposal § 5(b).
96 T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 741 (1985). Courts use the word "reasonable" in two different
contexts. First, a threshold inquiry determines whether the conduct at issue implicates a
"reasonable" expectation of privacy triggering fourth amendment review. Katz, 389 U.S. at
361 (Harlan concurring). Second, once such a privacy interest is recognized, courts ask
whether the government's conduct is "reasonable" by "balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails." T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 741.
'7 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. See also T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 741; Tennessee v. Garner, 469 U.S.
877 (1985). For an economic approach to balancing under the fourth amendment, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 640 (3d ed. 1986); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 S.Ct.Rev. 49.
98Cady v. Pombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
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ness of the means that the government actually employed. Bodily
intrusions such as forcing open a suspect's mouth to recover narcotics represent "conduct that shocks the conscience" and so violates the fourth amendment. 99 Urinalysis is more difficult to classify because it "requires a normal bodily function" and "is not an
extreme bodily invasion" 100 of the same magnitude.
Courts have not reached agreement on the intrusiveness of
urinalysis. Some courts liken urinalysis to the indignity suffered in
a body cavity search; 10 1 some find urinalysis "essentially indistinguishable" from a blood test;10 2 some assert that "urine testing. . .presents an even greater intrusion on privacy than does
blood testing; 10 3 still
others imply that urinalysis is less intrusive
104
than a blood test.
Intuitively, courts which view urinalysis as less intrusive than
a blood test present the strongest argument. Urinalysis is a minimally intrusive search; it does not involve an intrusion into the
skin, 105 but merely the collection of a naturally and frequently disposed of waste product. As one court has noted, "[t]he collection of
a urine sample has little in common with a stomach pumping. . .(or even with the taking of a blood sample, which requires
the infliction of an injury, albeit a small one). It is even less intrusive than a fingerprint, which requires that one's fingers be
smeared with grease and pressed against paper." 106 Urine specimens, moreover, are commonly collected and examined for routine
medical purposes. Because individuals undergo such tests customarily without objection, the intrusiveness of these tests is slight.1 0 7

99Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). For commentators discussing the intrusiveness of various searches, see Note, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily Intrusions, 68 Marquette L.Rev. 130 (1984); Note, Blood Alcohol Analysis and the Fourth
Amendment, 1984 Det.C.L.Rev. 1023-38 (1984).
100Turner, 500 A.2d at 1009.
101Tucker, 613 F.Supp. at 1129-30; Storms, 600 F.Supp. at 1220.
102 Shoemaker II, 619 F.Supp. at 1098; Capua, 643 F.Supp. at 1513; American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 733. Courts typically compare urinalysis to
blood tests because the Supreme Court has recognized that the extraction of blood can be a
highly invasive procedure which affects an individual's "interests in human dignity and privacy." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
103 Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 792; Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at 586.
104 Allen, 601 F.Supp. at 488; Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796, 800 (N.D. 1982);
Mack, 653 F.Supp. at 75; Shoemaker I, 608 F.Supp. at 1158; Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 1277, 663 F.Supp. at 1566.
105 But see Storms, 600 F.Supp. at 1218, quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769 (in a sense,
if not literally, urinalysis "is an 'intrusion beyond the body's surface' ").
106Mack, 653 F.Supp. at 75.
107 The Schmerber Court gave important weight to the fact blood tests were routinely

required in the medical context as an indication such tests can be reasonable. Schmerber,
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For these reasons, courts should view urinalysis as, at most, a minimally intrusive search.
A test's intrusiveness also depends significantly on the manner
in which the test is conducted.10 8 The United States Supreme
Court suggested guidelines for defining a reasonable test in
Schmerber v. California."9 First, the test must be a reasonable
means for establishing the fact sought."' The EMIT tests suggested in § 4 of the Drug Testing Proposal meet this standard by
offering 95 percent accuracy in lab tests. Second, the procedure involved in administering the test must be routine or "commonplace" such that it involves "virtually no risk, trauma or pain.""'
Giving a urine sample is a routine occurrence which involves no
risk of trauma or pain, especially when given in private. Finally,
according to Schmerber, a physician should perform the test in a
medical environment "according to accepted medical practices.""' 2
However, where a nontechnical procedure is utilized, as in the case
of urine collection, "[t]he simplicity of the test makes it unneces'' 3
sary to have it conducted by a physician. "
Courts have also noted that the procedure's intrusiveness is
heightened by the presence of inspectors supervising the tests."4
As one court has suggested, observation of a party during urination
''presents an even greater intrusion on privacy than does blood
testing.""' 5 However, the Drug Testing Proposal avoids this problem. Because accurate tests are possible without official observation," the government can conduct urinalysis in a way that meets
384 U.S. at 771 n.13.
'08 For example, the Caruso court referred to urination in the presence of another as
both "degrading" and "humiliating." Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 793; see also Tucker v.
Dickey, 613 F.Supp. 1124, 1130 (W.D.Wisc. 1985). If an observer is not present, these "degrading" or "humiliating" aspects decrease.
109 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
10 Id. at 771.
1 Id.
112 Id.
"I United States v. Smith, 470 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C.Cir. 1972); Weir, 657 F.2d 1005 (reasonable search where FBI agents combed and plucked the defendant's head, beard, and
mustache for hair samples); United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1974) (reasonable search where FBI agents swabbed the defendant's hand in order to ascertain the presence of dynamite particles). EMIT, the initial screening test for drugs, requires no specialized training to administer. See note 11.
114 See Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 880 n.5; Capua, 643 F.Supp. at 1511; Caruso, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 793.
'5 Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 793. But see American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 734 (lack of observation does not appreciably decrease the intrusiveness
of the search).
"I See the Drug Testing Proposal § 3(b).
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the Schmerber guidelines.
2. Governmental Interests Promoted by Urinalysis. Urinalysis
promotes numerous fundamental government interests. In considering the "reasonableness" of urinalysis, courts have balanced the
intrusiveness of the test against the following government interests: public safety, 11" employee safety, 1 " national security, 1 9 public
confidence in the integrity of a government agency, 1 0 the ability of
the employee to discharge his duties,' and efficiency in the workplace. 122 In addition, the government's interest in protecting itself
from tort liability as a result of safety violations by its employees
is substantial since employers are liable for the foreseeable acts of
their employees. A court conceivably could find the government liable for acts committed by a government employee while under the
influence of drugs. 2 3
The most important government interest promoted by urinalysis is public safety. This concern carries special force with regard
to positions "such as that of police officer, firefighter, bus driver, or
train engineer, where, given the nature of the work, the use of controlled substances would ordinarily pose situations fraught with
imminent and grave consequences to public safety.' 24 Courts have
given substantial weight to public safety concerns inherent in these
types of occupations when deciding upon the "reasonableness" of
urinalysis testing. For example, courts have repeatedly recognized
that in the case of a police officer "not only his life, but the lives of
the public" rest upon his actions.2 5 "[B]y reason of the fact they
carry weapons, drive cars, are engaged in dangerous work, those
[police officers] impaired by drug use present a positive danger to
26
others.'
Courts also have considered employee safety and national sel'Turner,

500 A.2d at 1008, City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1326; Bostic, 650 F.Supp.

at 250; Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267; Patchogue-Medford, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 892; Mullholland, 660
F.Supp. at 1570.
18 Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491; McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1307; Mack, 653 F.Supp. at 75;
Mullholland, 660 F.Supp. at 1570.
"I Callaway, 518 F.2d at 476; Mack, 653 F.Supp. at 75.
120 City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1324; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 795; Shoemaker I, 608
F.Supp. at 1158; Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 250.
121 Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 250; City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1324; Allen, 601 F.Supp.
at 491; Turner, 500 A.2d at 1008; Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at 589; Raab, 816 F.2d at 178.
122 Amalgamated Transit Union, 663 F.Supp. at 1568.
123 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
124 Patchogue-Medford, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
125 Turner, 500 A.2d at 1008; see also City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1324; Bostic, 650
F.Supp. at 250.
126 Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
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curity as factors to weigh against intrusiveness when determining
the reasonableness of urinalysis. In regard to both of these concerns, one court has noted that the government has a compelling
interest in testing where "drug use by an [FBI] agent could affect
the success of an operation implicating important national security
law enforcement objectives and could pose risk of injury to other
agents working with him.112 7 Like public safety considerations, employee safety and national security considerations obviously vary
with the government employee's occupation and can be nonexistent in some cases.
The Drug Testing Proposal recognizes that the federal government's interest in testing employees varies with the employee's responsibilities. Section 2 of the Drug Testing Proposal allows the
FDTA to determine the agencies or sectors that will be tested.
Given the limited resources of the government, the FDTA probably will focus only on those agencies that exhibit an overriding
need for testing. In granting the FDTA this discretion, the Drug
Testing Proposal ensures that the government will test only those
employees or applicants whom it is efficient or important to test.
The government's interest in maintaining public confidence in
the integrity of government employees likewise is compelling.12 s A
police officer's use of illegal substances, for example, would undermine public "confidence and respect.' ' 2 9 Public employees using
drugs while on duty seriously hinder the credibility of the government. Moreover, at least one court has recognized that the government has "a legitimate, if lesser, interest in preventing such offduty conduct."'130
Another factor that courts have balanced against the intrusiveness of urinalysis is the government's interest in overseeing an
employee's "performance of his duties." The seminal case in this
emerging body of law, Allen v. City of Marietta,'3 upheld a government testing program as reasonable because the government's

127

Mack, 653 F.Supp. at 75.

128

See, e.g., Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (Urinalysis is legitimate because "the govern-

ment has a recognized and a legitimate interest in maintaining [employee] integrity" in certain occupations).
229 City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1324; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 796; Biehunik, 441
F.2d at 230; O'Brien, 544 F.2d at 546; Barry, 712 F.2d at 1560.
The public confidence aspect is arguably less applicable in the case of some government
employees although other government interests such as efficiency and employee performance may override these differences. The difference between the importance of the public's
confidence in a policeman and a postal clerk is pronounced and must be taken into account.
ISo Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 250.
131601 F.Supp. 482 (N.D.Ga. 1985).
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interest in overseeing its employees' performance outweighed the
intrusiveness of urinalysis. The analysis in the Allen decision has
broad implications. Unlike some interests that vary or become
nonexistent depending upon an individual's occupation, the government's interest in overseeing its employees' performance remains relatively constant. Whether a government employee is a police officer or postal clerk, the government has an important
interest, just as private employers do, in overseeing its workers'
performance."3 2
3. Completing the Balancing Test. One must balance the intrusiveness of the test against the government interest at stake to
determine the "reasonableness" of a government drug testing program. Courts in the urinalysis context, with some exceptions, 13 3
34
have found government urine testing programs unreasonable.1
Many courts have found that the intrusiveness of testing outweighs
the government interest promoted by such tests. Are such conclusions correct?
As suggested above, urinalysis is a test of minimal intrusiveness. Although the government's interest in testing varies among
occupations, in general it seems to outweigh urinalysis' intrusiveness. In some occupations involving public safety, employee safety,
or national security, the government's interest easily will overcome
this minimal intrusion. For example, air traffic controllers, public
transit employees, police officers, firefighters, and military personnel all perform tasks for which it is necessary-either for public
safety, the safety of other employees, or national security-that
they perform their duties responsibly. In other occupations, however, public safety, employee safety, or national security rationales
do not apply.
Consider, for example, a post office employee. Except in unusual circumstances, public safety is not threatened by his erratic
behavior; his actions typically do not threaten the safety of others
or undermine national security. However, independent factors sug-

, One court has recognized a particular government interest in "workplace efficiency."
See Amalgamated Transit Union, 663 F.Supp. at 1569.
33 Allen, 601 F.Supp. at 491; Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1143; McDonell, 809 F.2d at
1308; Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267; Callaway, 518 F.2d at 477; Turner, 500 A.2d at 1009; Raab,
816 F.2d at 182; White, No. CIV-1-87-187, slip op. at 4 (cited in note 38); Mullholland, 660
F.Supp. at 1570; Rushton, 653 F.Supp. at 1525.
"' For a sampling of such cases, see Capua, 643 F.Supp. at 1520; Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d
at 798; American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 732; Lovvorn, 647
F.Supp. at 883; Amalgamated Transit Union, 663 F.Supp. at 1569; Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at
583.

1362

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:1335

gest that urinalysis is reasonable. The government's interest in assuring the public confidence in the post office is an example of one
such interest. Likewise, the government has a legitimate interest in
the post office employee's efficiency. If a number of employees
were unable to perform their jobs efficiently, such conduct might
impair the agency's ability to fulfill its statutory obligations.
"[W]here an employee's misconduct is contrary to the agency's
mission, the agency need not present proof of a direct effect on the
employee's job performance" to remove the employee under current law. 13 5
Arguments downplaying the importance of these interests are
unpersuasive. Some argue that urinalysis is not necessary to monitor an employee's job performance. While in some cases an employee's drug use will manifest itself through the employee's absences, tardiness, and errors, other situations exist where
supervisors cannot readily discover employee errors. Where such
discrepancies could prove extremely costly," 8 drug testing offers an
effective means of preventing significant governmental losses.
Courts have suggested that many of the government interests
advanced above prove too much. 3 7 One might contend, for example, that the government integrity rationale posits no limit to
search powers. This argument, however, ignores the other half of
the "reasonableness" test: the intrusiveness of the search. While
the government could justify a minimally intrusive search like
urinalysis by pointing to relatively weak government interests (for
example, public confidence in government employees), the government could not justify a highly intrusive search (for instance, involving an employee's home), by pointing to these same values.
The government integrity rationale thus need not entail wholesale
approval of all government searches.
C.

Fourth Amendment Procedural Requirements
Opponents of the Drug Testing Proposal might maintain that

35 Allrod v. Department of Health and Human Services, 786 F.2d 1128, 1131 (Fed.Cir.
1986). See also Wild v. United States, 692 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1982). This argument
for urinalysis does not exist in the private sector. Government agencies are required to perform certain duties by law. By contrast, the objectives of private employers do not depend
on statutory specifications.
'3' For example, suppose the government obtains benefits of $100 from each of its 2.8
million employees. If drug use causes a 10 percent reduction in the performance of 25 percent of these employees, the total government loss is a substantial $7 million.
37 See, e.g., American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 735; McDonell, 612 F.Supp. at 1131.
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government drug testing violates fourth amendment strictures
against warrantless searches. Ordinarily, the government must conduct its searches pursuant to warrants approved by a neutral and
detached magistrate and based upon a "probable cause"1"8 belief
that the particular party to be searched has violated the law. 3 9
Although probable cause is the usual standard for issuance of
a warrant, courts have accepted a lesser standard in some circumstances.1 40 For example, in the urinalysis context, many courts
have found that the proper standard of belief is one of reasonable
1 42
suspicion 4-a lower standard than probable cause.
Likewise, while warrants are generally required to conduct
constitutional searches, warrantless searches are not per se unconstitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified certain categories of exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. Apart from these exceptions, the Court has held that
random searches not conducted pursuant to a warrant may be constitutional in certain circumstances. This subsection first will argue
that urinalysis pursuant to the Drug Testing Proposal falls within
two of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. It
then will demonstrate that the case law upholding random warrantless searches supports the Drug Testing Proposal.
1. WarrantRequirement Exceptions. Three traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement exist. First, a warrant is not required to frisk a suspect in exigent circumstances: for instance,
where an immediate danger to government officials or the commu238 Public officials have probable cause to search "where 'the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that a criminal
offense had occurred." T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 755 (Brennan dissenting in part), quoting Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971).
See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (allowing warrantless building codes inspection pursuant to "reasonable . . . administrative standards"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)(police officer may, without a
warrant, conduct a pat-down "stop-and-frisk" search based on probable cause); Sec. & Law
Enforcement Emp. Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 1984)(reasonable
suspicion standard governs warrantless strip-searches of corrections officers within prisons).
"I White, No. CIV-1-87-187, slip op. at 6 (cited in note 38); Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at
587; Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12, 524 A.2d 430, 437; Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1277, 663 F.Supp. at 1568; Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 882; Capua, 643
F.Supp. at 1517; City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1325; Turner, 500 A.2d at 1011; Caruso, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 799.
1'42The reasonable suspicion test requires government officials to "point to specific objective facts and rational inferences that they are entitled to draw from these facts in light
of their experience." City of Palm Bay, 475 So.2d at 1326.
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nity exists. 14 Second, officials need not have a warrant where the
suspect may destroy evidence or vanish while a warrant is being
obtained. 144 Third, government officials need not obtain a warrant
to conduct an administrative search. 145 Finally, in addition to these
traditional warrant exceptions, a federal district court has upheld
the constitutionality of warrantless searches performed by the government acting in its proprietary capacity.1 46 Arguably, both the
administrative search exception and the proprietary capacity exception exempt the government from the fourth amendment's warrant requirements when it conducts urinalysis tests pursuant to
4
the Drug Testing Proposal.1 1
a. Administrative Search Exception and Regulated Industries. The Supreme Court first ruled on the administrative search
exception when holding that housing inspectors are exempt from
fourth amendment warrant requirements because of the unique
character of their job.14 8 Since this decision, courts have extended
the administrative search exception to uphold warrantless blanket
searches in a number of instances,1 49 including blanket searches at
the premises of certain heavily regulated industries.1 50 Recently,
MTerry, 392

U.S. at 20.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
145 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). Administrative searches occur primarily in
"pervasively regulated industries" which have long been subject to government supervision
144

and regulation. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
16 Allen, 601 F.Supp. at 491.
7 The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is not applicable to
government employee or applicant urinalysis. No "immediate" danger exists to other government officials or to the community at large as a result of employee drug use.
The dissipating exception argument is also weak. Drugs will dissipate in the body over
time. See Ewing v. State, 310 N.E.2d 571 (Ind.Ct.App. 1974) (noting that drugs like alcohol
diminish in the blood over time). However, this exception is not relevant in the present
context because the Drug Testing Proposal utilizes random testing. The exception applies
only where the evidence sought to be preserved clearly exists. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69
(exception applied because police had reason to believe that subject was intoxicated). In a
random program, one cannot predict whether the randomly selected individual is a drug
user; thus, one has no particularized reason to believe that there is a danger of dissipation.
10 Camara, 387 U.S. 523. The Court justified the exception because of the public health
interest in housing inspection and the inability of housing inspectors to identify dangerous
conditions from outside a building.
4I See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976)(border areas);
Davis, 482 F.2d at 912 (airport departure gates); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232-33
(6th Cir. 1972)(courthouse doors); Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F.Supp. 266, 274 (M.D.Tenn.
1971)(same).
150See, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. 594 (mines and stone quarries); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972)(gun dealers). Moreover, in Ortega, 107 S.Ct. at 1504, the plurality opinion suggested that the administrative search exception might be applicable to testing of
government employees. The Court found the warrant and probable cause requirements imposed an insurmountable burden on government employers engaged in work-related
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the Supreme Court has justified government administrative
searches of pervasively regulated industries for two reasons. First,
the Court has argued that the government's interest in these
searches is great, as evidenced by the government's decision to regulate the industry in the first place. 5 ' Second, the Court has argued that corresponding knowledge and voluntary acceptance of
the regulatory interest1 52 reduces an individual's expectation of
privacy. 15 3
In the urinalysis context, the Second Circuit has upheld the
random testing of jockeys based on this rationale. 1 54 Finding a
strong state interest in preserving public confidence in the racing
industry (manifested in state regulation of that industry) and also
a reduced expectation of privacy for jockeys (due to the advance
notice provided by such pervasive regulation), the Second Circuit
held that urine testing does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 5
Does the "pervasive regulation" rationale extend to drug testing
56
for public employees? Courts disagree on this issue.
The Drug Testing Proposal outlined herein seeks justification
from both of the two factors behind the Second Circuit's view. As
noted earlier, the government retains an interest in maintaining
public confidence in its employees. In addition, the nature of public employment and the advance notice provisions of the Drug
Testing Proposal serve to reduce employee's legitimate expectations of privacy in this context. The Proposal thus may come
within the administrative search exception dealing with regulated
industries. After all, what can be more pervasively regulated than
the government itself?

searches, and substituted a standard of reasonableness under all circumstances.
151See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 606.
152 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313 (an entrepreneur embarking upon such a business voluntarily chooses to subject himself to a full arsenal of government regulation).
,53 See, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600:
A warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the
federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of
commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to
periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.
,54 Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142.
155 Id. at 1142-43.
Some courts have found the pervasive regulation exception does not apply in the
context of government urinalysis testing. See, e.g., Capua, 643 F.Supp. at 1519; Caruso, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 798; American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 734; Fraternal Order of Police, 524 A.2d at 435; Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at 591. But see Raab, 816
F.2d at 179 (government employee testing is analogous to pervasive regulation exceptions);
Rushton, 653 F.Supp. at 1524-25 (same).
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b. Government Action in Its ProprietaryCapacity as an Employer Exception. A recent emerging exception to the warrant requirement focuses on the government's ability to "investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's performance of his
duties. '157 This exception maintains that public and private employers should have the same investigatory rights in regard to their
employees. 158
Many courts have rejected such an exception to the warrant
requirement. 159 One court, objecting to the notion that one should
regard public employees as similar to private employees, stated
that "it will be a dark day indeed when the United States government finds it appropriate to abandon the strictures of the Constitution in favor of a less burdensome 'private-sector' set of rules
that can allow for infringement of constitutional rights."'16 0 In the
urinalysis context, only a few courts have adopted this exception to
the fourth amendment warrant requirements.' 6 ' Nevertheless, the
exception is a plausible one in light of contemporary conditions.
To treat public employees differently from private employees
in the urinalysis context is to place the government as an employer
at a disadvantage compared with private employers. This effect
can be substantial in situations where the government competes
with private employers: for example, Federal Express versus Next
Day Mail or private versus public education. There, the costs of
drug use among its employees makes the government an inefficient
competitor vis-a-vis private business.
More importantly, the modern administrative state posits a
role for the federal government that frequently entails exclusive
control over vast regulatory responsibilities-a task undertaken by
a teeming bureaucracy of federal employees. Under such conditions, a jurisprudence that bars circumscribed assertions of control
by the government in its capacity as employer may jeopardize the
effective fulfillment of tasks for which there exists no alternative
institution. Taking these factors into account, application of the
employer exception to government drug testing programs seems
plausible.
Allen, 601 F.Supp. at 491.
Allen, 601 F.Supp. at 491; Patchogue-Medford, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 893. See also Collins,
349 F.2d at 868; Bunkers, 521 F.2d at 1220; United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1964); Donato, 269 F.Supp. at 924.
.59
See, e.g., Capua, 643 F.Supp at 1519; American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 737.
160 American Federation of Government Employees, 651 F.Supp. at 737.
181 Patchogue-Medford, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 895; Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 250.
158
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2. The Random Nature of the Drug Testing Proposal. Completely apart from exceptions to the warrant requirement, courts
have upheld the constitutionality of random searches not conducted pursuant to search warrants.16 2 Courts have consistently
recognized that random searches and seizures violate the fourth
amendment only when the government leaves the selection of
targets solely in the hands of a field officer.1 63 If the government
implements indiscriminate screening procedures and the urine
testing of government employees is not "subject to the discretion
of the official in the field," such tests can pass constitutional scrutiny.1 6 4 In two contexts, courts have upheld random searches and
relaxed the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards. In
both situations, courts have justified their holdings by emphasizing
that the administrative scheme at issue left no discretion in the
hands of officers in the field.
First, courts have upheld random searches in the airport magnetometer situation. Here, the testing procedure vests no discretion in the administrator because every passenger must pass
through a magnetometer to board a plane. Pointing to this lack of
discretion, courts have upheld these random tests as constitutional.6 5 Only one condition attaches to such searches: each prospective passenger must retain the right to leave rather than sub66
mit to the search..
Courts also have upheld the constitutionality of random
searches in which the police have established roadblocks to check
for valid drivers' licenses 6 7 or to determine the residency of individuals entering the United States. 68 In Delaware v. Prouse,6 9 for
example, the Supreme Court found that driver's license stops at
the random discretion of police officers were unconstitutional.
Such a practice vested too much discretion in the hands of officers
142 For cases accepting random testing, see Mullholland, 660 F.Supp. at 1569; Rushton,
653 F.Supp. at 1525; Raab, 816 F.2d at 182; Mack, 653 F.Supp. at 70; Callaway, 518 F.2d at
477; McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
163 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975). The notion that programs leaving discretion in the hands of government officials in the field violates the fourth amendment transforms the fourth amendment
into an anti-discrimination amendment. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 96-97
(1977).
64 Camara, 387 U.S. at 532; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566-67.
' Davis, 482 F.2d at 910. Here, the court also focused on the important government

interest in preventing hijacking and the minimal intrusiveness of these tests.
166Id. at 910-11.
167 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
168Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at, 564-66.
16'

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.

1368

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:1335

at the scene of the search. But the Prouse Court went on to add
that police roadblocks are constitutionally permissible if they "do
not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion," noting that
"[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops is
17 0
one possible" type of constitutional search.

Some courts upholding government employee drug testing
have stressed that the random nature of the drug test solves fourth
amendment concerns.17 1 One court noted that officer discretion in
selecting those to test "presented the potential for abuse" and suggested that "computer-guided random selection procedures" would
be less problematic. 7 2 Another court noted that the "unbridled
discretion" of the government employer conducting such tests was
"contrary to the very tenet of the Fourth Amendment.'

73

The Drug Testing Proposal outlines a scheme that passes constitutional scrutiny because the proposal does not vest discretion
in drug test administrators. Section 2 of the Drug Testing Proposal, calling for an independent agency to monitor the testing and
for random testing, ensures that no employer bias against an employee will manifest itself in arbitrary tests. Similarly, § 3 mandates that the Drug Testing Agency officials have no discretion
about which individuals to test. The agency must promulgate some
random, neutral regulation that will ensure fairness in testing.
IV.

DUE PROCESS PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

Thus far, this comment has concentrated on the fourth
amendment implications of required employee drug testing. In an
effort to illuminate the rationale behind the Drug Testing Proposal's evaluation and termination requirements, contained in § 5 of
the proposal, this section considers a problem beyond the scope of
the fourth amendment: if an employee tests positive for drugs,
what remedies are available to an employer?
Id. at 663 (emphasis added). In concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted "that the
Court's reservation also includes other not purely random stops." Id. at 670. It is unnecessary for a checkpoint stop to stop every car in order to be systematic. Officers merely must
follow some pattern-for example, every third car-minimizing their discretion in choosing
whether to stop any particular car.
,' For courts accepting random urinalysis, see, e.g., Rushton, 653 F.Supp. at 1525; McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308; Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1143.
172 Storms, 600 F.Supp. at 1223.
,71Capua, 643 F.Supp. at 1515; see also Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 881 (failing to limit
official-in-the-field discretion makes the test constitutionally impermissible).
170
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Employment as a Property Right

The Constitution does not create property interests. Rather,
"they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law. .. . 4 A program of government drug testing
might implicate two types of property rights. First, if a federal,
state, or local statute provides that certain government employees
are entitled to retain their position during good behavior and efficient service and the statute also provides that the government
may terminate such employees only with good cause, then the statute vests such persons with a property right in their employment. 175 Courts have applied this type of reasoning in the urinal76
ysis context.1
An individual may also have a property interest in his good
name and reputation when a public employer publicly discloses the
17
reasons for an employee's discharge and those reasons are false.
In the urinalysis context, one court has noted that where no "provisions [were] made to protect the confidentiality interests" of government employees, an individual's property interest in his reputation is implicated. 7 8 In the present context, however, this
argument is weak since the Drug Testing Proposal forbids public
disclosure of drug test results.
B.

Due Process Termination Requirements

Because a non-probationary employee enjoys a property interest in his job in certain circumstances, the government must terminate such an employee subject to due process requirements. 7 9
Under the due process clause, a deprivation of life, liberty, or property must "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."''8 0 Adequate notice requires
M7'
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491 (1985); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
M Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. at 1491.
17 Capua, 653 F.Supp. at 1520; Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 251; Lovvorn, 647 F.Supp. at 883.
M Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 598
F.Supp. 1456, 1473 (M.D.Ga. 1984).
M Capua, 643 F.Supp. at 1520.
M'Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. at 1493-94. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" U.S.Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment puts a similar restraint
upon the national government: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . ." U.S.Const. amend. V.
11oMullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See also Boddie v.
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only that the government provide the tenured public employee
with oral or written notice of the charges against him.'81 Whereas
the formality and procedural prerequisites for a "fair hearing" vary
depending on the importance of the interests at stake, 182 a number
of widely accepted procedural safeguards exist in the public employment context. 83 First, the government must advise the employee "of the cause or causes for his termination in sufficient detail to enable him fairly to show any error that may exist."' 1 4
Second, the government must advise the employee "of the names
and the nature of the testimony of witnesses against him."'8 5
Third, the government must accord the employee "a meaningful
opportunity to be heard in his own defense."'18 6 Finally, the employee's hearing should be before a tribunal "that both possesses
some expertise [in the occupation of the employee] and has an apparent impartiality toward the charges.' 8 7 The government, moreover, must grant the employee some kind of hearing before discharging the employee. 8 8 This hearing can be "something less"
than a full evidentiary hearing.'8 9
In addition to these due process considerations, federal statutes impose limits on the government's ability to terminate its employees. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 1513(a), prohibits
the federal government from dismissing federal employees unless
the government can show that such a dismissal promotes "the efficiency of the service."' 190 The case law is inconclusive on the question of whether drug use is an action that can result in termination
under this procedure.' 9 ' Nonetheless, one can conclude, as did the
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971).
18, Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. at 1495; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170-71
(1974).
182

Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.

183For cases discussing due process requirements of urinalysis testing see Lovvorn, 647

F.Supp. at 883; Jones, 628 F.Supp. at 1507; Bostic, 650 F.Supp. at 251.
"' Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970). Regarding this requirement,
the Fifth Circuit has noted in Banks v. FAA, 687 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1982), that due
process requires the government to grant employees an opportunity to test, on their own
behalf, their voluntarily submitted urine samples.
188 Ferguson, 430 F.2d at 856.
188 Id.
187 Id.
188 Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. Loudermill supports its requirement of a presuspension hearing conclusion by finding that employee interests outweigh government interests in
this context. Id. at 1494-95.
188 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
1905 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982).
181 Compare Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1266 (7th Cir. 1977)(unlawful possession of controlled substance had no detrimental effect on the efficiency of the service and
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Second Circuit in Borsari v. F.A.A.,' 9 ' that where an employee's
misconduct-on or off the job-"conflicts with the mission of the
agency, dismissal without proof of a direct effect on the individual's job performance is permissible under the 'efficiency of the
service' standard." Thus, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 does
not require the government to demonstrate that an employee's
drug use directly effects his job performance. Rather, the government must merely show that the employee's drug use conflicts with
the mission of his governmental employer.
The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also
explicitly recognize that the denial of employment opportunities
on the basis of alcohol or drug use is justified only under limited
circumstances. The Amendments note that the term "handicapped
individual" does "not include any individual who is an alcoholic or
drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to the property or the safety of others."' 93
However, by negative inference, this Amendment prohibits discrimination against individuals who are able to perform a job."
The Act thus protects former drug addicts and alcoholics currently
under control.' 95 As the Act stands, the government may remove
the employee only if that person is clearly incapable of performing
his job.
Courts, in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, have held that
the government must attempt to accommodate an employee's substance abuse problems. Recently, for example, a federal court overturned the discharge of an alcoholic employee of the Defense Department who had been repeatedly absent from work. 9 ' Prior to
his termination, the employee had undergone treatment for alcoholism. Following the treatment, he was again absent without authorization on several occasions, although the later absences were
unrelated to his alcoholic condition. In discharging him, the department considered his pre-treatment and post-treatment absences cumulatively. The court ruled that the department should
thus dismissal not justified), with Borasari v. F.A.A., 699 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir.
1983)(drug use conflicts with agency's mission and dismissal is permissible).
M92699 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Masino v. United States, 589 F.2d 1048 (Ct.C.
1978)(upholding discharge of a customs officer following his off-duty use of marijuana);
Giles v. United States, 553 F.2d 647 (Ct.Cl. 1977)(IRS agent dismissed for failing to file
timely tax returns); Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1976) (Immigration and
Naturalization Service official removed for employing illegal aliens in his home).
.93 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96, 706(7)(B)
(1982).
19
See 124 Cong.Rec. 37,509 (Oct. 14, 1978)(remarks of Sen. Williams).
'o' See Davis v. Bucher, 451 F.Supp. 791, 796 (E.D.Pa. 1978).
199 Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F.Supp. 757, 763 (D.D.C. 1985).
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have forgiven, and not considered at all, the absences that pre197
dated the employee's treatment for alcoholism.
Government urinalysis programs that involve employee termination must incorporate the procedural requirements outlined
above. Section 5 of the Drug Testing Proposal takes into account
these requirements. The Drug Testing Proposal makes every effort
to rehabilitate an employee rather than terminate him. However, if
termination is necessary, § 5 provides a comprehensive scheme
that ensures an employee is terminated in accordance with due
process of law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Drug use is a pervasive problem in American society. The effects of such use make it a public and not a private crisis. Random
federal government drug testing of federal employees or federal
employment applicants is a partial solution to this difficulty. Despite assertions to the contrary, such testing does not ignore "the
principle as old as the common law" that "the individual shall
have full protection in person and property." 198 Rather, such testing personifies the suggestion that from time to time it is necessary
for courts to "define anew" the exact nature and extent of "an individual's protection in his person."' 9 Drug use requires the courts
to "define anew" an individual's fourth amendment protection. A
properly administered random urinalysis program can pass constitutional scrutiny.

,97 Id. at 762.
'98
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193
(1890).
199 Id.

